Ukraine: A country fighting antisemitism, far from the “Nazism” attributed to it by Russian propaganda

From France to Ukraine, the same question: How can we fight antisemitism?

In a previous article, I examined the driving forces and mechanisms of antisemitism in France through the lens of systemic geopolitics. I then looked at different trajectories and models, such as Azerbaijan, whose history and environment are completely different from ours, but which offers a particularly interesting case when it comes to coexistence between its communities. Today, I would like to continue this series by focusing on Ukraine.

Ukraine is a country I frequently visit during my research on deported children and the human impact of the war. These trips have given me the opportunity to see a Ukraine that cannot be reduced to the images served to us every day by the media or to clashes between competing political narratives.

When reality contradicts the narrative

In geopolitics, certain words cease to be mere descriptions and become instruments of combat. Since February 2022, this has been the case with the term “Nazi” in Kremlin discourse. To justify its invasion, Russia has presented itself as having the mission of “denazifying” Ukraine, which it accuses of being controlled by an extremist ideology. The narrative is familiar: Moscow portrays itself as Europe’s savior in the face of an alleged hotbed of neo-Nazism and radical antisemitism. The problem is that the Russian narrative construction runs into the institutional and sociological realities of a much more nuanced contemporary Ukraine. 

Nor should we deceive ourselves: Ukraine is not free from antisemitism, just as no European state can claim to be. Like its neighbors, it has a heavy history of pogroms, collaboration with the Nazi occupier, and mass crimes. The question is what place antisemitism occupies within the state, at the ballot box, and in society.

The figures and institutions speak volumes. Ukraine overwhelmingly elected a Jewish president as head of state; in 2021, its Parliament passed a law formally prohibiting antisemitism; and far-right parties have been electorally marginalized. Far from being a “Nazi regime,” the country offers a striking example of the political transformation of a post-Soviet society confronting its past.

Zelensky, or the end of Jewish identity as a political marker

Volodymyr Zelensky won the presidential election in April 2019 by an overwhelming margin, receiving 73.22% of the vote in the second round against 24.45% for Petro Poroshenko. The data from the Central Election Commission leave little room for interpretation. What is striking about Zelensky is that his Jewish identity did not prevent him from winning. In a country supposedly infested with neo-Nazis, such a margin is an anomaly.

Before him, Volodymyr Groysman, who came from a Jewish family, had already served as Prime Minister from 2016 to 2019. Thus, a Jewish-born head of government and a Jewish president coexisted at the highest levels of the executive branch, which makes little sense if one accepts the idea of an antisemitic government ideology.

An election alone does not prove the absence of antisemitism, but it does show that a Jewish identity can coexist with a majority electoral mandate.

Surveys point in the same direction. According to the Anti-Defamation League, the antisemitic attitudes index in Ukraine fell from 46 in 2019 to 29 in 2023, its lowest level, a decline that the organization considers one of the most significant in Europe.

For its part, the Pew Research Center notes that 73% of Ukrainians would accept Jews as neighbors, a score higher than in several European countries.

If Ukraine were under the control of a neo-Nazi ideology, this would of course be reflected in election results. The figures from 2019 are clear: in the parliamentary elections, the coalition of radical nationalist right-wing forces received only 2.15% of the vote. This is confirmed by data from the Ukrainian Electoral Commission concerning the Svoboda list, a score that was insufficient to reach the 5% threshold required to obtain seats at the national level. 

That said, one cannot conclude from this that the far right does not exist in Ukraine. There is an organized far right, as in many democracies across the continent, with radical groups, violence, and movements that have made no secret of their xenophobic or antisemitic rhetoric. But it is important to distinguish between the mere existence of such a fringe and the idea that it dominates the state.

The decisive turning point: The Ukrainian State enshrines the fight against antisemitism in law

On September 22, 2021, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted Law No. 1770-IX, “On the Prevention and Combating of Antisemitism in Ukraine.” The law legally defines antisemitism, prohibits manifestations of it, and establishes civil, administrative, and criminal liability for violations. The legislation specifically targets calls for violence against people of Jewish origin, hate speech, Holocaust denial, and the justification of the Holocaust.

A state is also judged by the protection it provides to its minorities, and modern Ukraine has made its position clear: antisemitism is not a political opinion that must be tolerated, but a form of hatred that the state has a duty to combat. 

Babi Yar: Ukrainian history can neither be erased nor instrumentalized

It would be difficult to erase or rewrite the past. Ukraine experienced pogroms and collaboration with the Nazi occupier. One cannot ignore what happened at Babi Yar, near Kyiv, where more than 33,000 Jews were massacred in two days in September 1941.

This does not call for an idealized vision of the country, but it equally prevents the opposite approach: using past crimes to claim that present-day Ukraine is inherently Nazi.

A nation is not condemned to perpetuate its past mistakes. In the same way that France is not Vichy France, and Germany is not Hitler’s Germany, present-day Ukraine cannot mechanically be equated with the nationalists of the last century. The proof can be found in the work of remembrance carried out around Babi Yar.

The paradox becomes apparent when the discourse of “denazification” collides with reality. On March 1, 2022, while Moscow was invoking the need to purge Ukraine of Nazism, a Russian strike on Kyiv’s television tower sent debris onto the Babi Yar site. The memorial survived, but the symbolism of a missile strike reaching one of Europe’s most important Holocaust memorial sites is not insignificant. 

The Righteous Among the Nations: Another face of Ukraine

History can also be viewed from another perspective: that of those who risked their lives to save Jews. Yad Vashem has documented and recognized a considerable number of Righteous Among the Nations, providing an important indicator for understanding Ukraine.

It is the Yad Vashem Institute that awards the title of “Righteous Among the Nations” to non-Jews who demonstrated selfless altruism, placing their lives, safety, or freedom at risk to save Jews during the Holocaust.

The figures are striking: 

Ukraine

Reference population: approximately 38.3 million

Righteous Among the Nations: 2,707

Approximately 7.1 per 100,000

Russia / RSFSR

Reference population: approximately 109.3 million

Righteous Among the Nations: 221

Aapproximately 0.20 per 100,000

In other words, relative to its population, Ukraine has approximately 35 times more Righteous Among the Nations than Russia. 

Systemic Vigilance Index (SVI)

Application to societal resilience and antisemitism in Ukraine: August 2026

The SVI does not simply count antisemitic acts. It is a measure that seeks to identify the interactions between elements capable of weakening a society over the long term, whether in terms of radicalization, identity-based tensions, information warfare, or the strength of institutions in the face of external influence.

The analysis of the Ukrainian situation is somewhat paradoxical. While geopolitical and informational risks are significant, domestic antisemitism is relatively well contained. 

Area	Level	Trend	Analysis
Societal antisemitism	🟢	↘	Decline in hostile attitudes in Ukraine in recent years.
Institutional protection	🟢	↗	Institutional commitment to protecting the Jewish community through the adoption of legislation against antisemitism.
Far right	🟢	↘	Ultranationalist political movements have no real political control and remain marginal at the ballot box.
Social cohesion	🟡	↘	Society is under considerable pressure due to collective trauma and population displacement caused by the war.
Information warfare	🔴	↗	Ukraine is a prime target for disinformation, particularly accusations of antisemitism or “Nazism.”
Geopolitical environment	🔴	↗	The conflict with Russia is the primary source of systemic vulnerability and has indirect repercussions on all social balances.

Overall Assessment

Ukraine SVI Index (August 2026): 🟡 Level 2 : Managed vigilance, but a first-order external vulnerability.